Niger Delta: pipeline attacks fuel fears of a return to militancy

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The Niger Delta – a lucrative oil-producing region in southern Nigeria – is vital to the country’s economy (Image Source: Flickr, Sosialistisk Ungdom)

A spate of attacks on oil pipelines since the emergence last year of a new armed group – the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) – has sparked fears of a return to militancy in Nigeria’s long-troubled southern oil-producing region. The attacks have dented oil production and focused the attention of President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration on the Niger Delta, where the last large-scale insurgency ended after an amnesty deal was signed between the government and rebels in 2009.

Despite the agreement initially being effective in dampening down the insurgency, the underlying causes of the region’s strife – endemic poverty, inequality and economic underdevelopment – have been allowed to fester over the past eight years, providing fertile ground for the emergence of the NDA and leaving the Niger Delta facing the very real prospect of a return to conflict.

In April 2016, the newly-formed Niger Delta Avengers pledged to ‘’take the struggle to new heights’’, and proceeded to carry out a spate of attacks on oil installations in the following months. The group’s membership structure is shrouded in obscurity; however, the NDA is thought to include former rebel fighters from several now-defunct groups – such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the Niger Delta People’s Salvation Front. The NDA emerged soon after President Buhari’s decision to cut funding for the 2009 amnesty programme, which had promised monthly cash handouts and training for former militants.

The NDA has demonstrated a significant level of planning and expertise in its operations, carried out in pursuit of its stated goal to ‘’cripple Nigeria’s economy’’ through attacks on energy installations. In February 2016, it blew up an underwater pipeline operated by Shell before going on to attack two Chevron export terminals. In November 2016, the group also blew up three pipelines carrying 500,000 barrels of oil a day to a Shell terminal in Bayelsa state. The spate of attacks over the past twelve months appears to have had the desired effect, causing the country’s oil production to drop to 1.65 million barrels per day, in comparison to the projected output of 2.2 million.

While attacks against oil installations are now at an eight-year high and causing significant damage to Nigeria’s fragile economy, this type of militant activity in the Niger Delta is far from a new phenomenon. Across several decades, the area has spawned a number of militant groups seeking to disrupt the energy industry, motivated by desire to fight for rights of the region’s citizens against a long history of perceived marginalization at the hands of local elites and western energy companies.

Despite the Niger Delta bringing in billions of dollars in oil revenue, the vast majority of the region’s 31-million inhabitants continue to live in abject poverty, with few job opportunities and a lack of access to basic infrastructure, education and health services. More than half of the population survive on less than $2 per day and less than 50% have regular access to safe drinking water.

Trapped in a life of poverty and economic insecurity, the people of the Niger Delta continue to experience the feelings of vulnerability and helplessness which have driven cycles of violent conflict for decades. The upsurge in pipeline bombings since the emergence of the NDA serves as a worrying reminder of the tensions and frustrations which lay just beneath the surface, in a region which has long suffered the ills of the ‘resource curse’.

The current tensions can therefore only be understood within the context of the Niger Delta’s history as an oil-rich yet poverty-stricken region, in which the local population has received few benefits from the energy industry. This unequal relationship originated during the colonial era, when European countries asserted their control over trade in the region, signalling the beginning of a long-history of resentment from the marginalized local population. British firms Shell and BP began oil exploration in the 1950s, sparking tensions as the Delta’s Ijaw ethnic majority were excluded from the rewards of the oil wealth. This profound sense of inequality became further ingrained after Nigeria’s independence in 1960, as British, Dutch, French and Italian oil companies extended their dominance of the energy sector.

As the century progressed, it became clear that the oil companies and political elite were receiving the bulk of profits from the Niger Delta’s resources. Tensions within the local community over the perceived unfair distribution of wealth soon translated into active resistance, characterized by the emergence of the first armed militias, such as the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF).

A new wave of militant groups emerged in the 2000s, deploying violent tactics including bombings and kidnappings, which pushed-up world oil prices and focused international attention. In 2009 however, militant leaders signed up to a ceasefire and government-sponsored amnesty process, which resulted in up to 30,000 former militants receiving monthly handouts from the state.

Whilst this had the effect of stabilizing the situation, the underlying issues remained unresolved and the negative impacts of the oil industry did not disappear. In recent years, frustrations have gradually risen as companies have failed to clean-up a legacy of environmental damage, lost livelihoods and broken societies. Due to repeated oil spills, traditional fishing and farming activities have become almost impossible across large swathes of once-fertile land.

A 2011 UN Environment Programme (UNEP) report recommended that oil companies spend $6bn cleaning up contaminated farmland, providing further legitimacy to the long-standing complaints of environmental degradation by local people.

According to human rights group Amnesty International, the four worst-polluted sites mentioned in the UN report – Bomu Manifold, Boobanabe, Barabeedom Swamp and Okuluebu – remain heavily polluted. Activists say that the 7000-km long network of pipelines passing through the region is rapidly ageing and in need of urgent repairs to prevent leaks. However, the oil companies argue that the theft of oil by militants is largely to blame for the environmental damage.

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Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari has cut funding to an amnesty scheme by 70%, raising concerns of a renewed insurgency (Image Source: Flickr, Chatham House)

In light of these issues, tensions under the surface have once again become visible in the form of the latest wave of attacks by the NDA. President Buhari last year promised a tough response, stating: ‘’we will deal with them [Niger Delta militants] in the same way we dealt with Boko Haram’’.

However, a response of further securitization and militarization may serve only to perpetuate the cycle of instability which has been prevalent in the Niger Delta for decades, adding to the failure to address the root causes of conflict. Short-term, militaristic solutions ignore the fact that in a region plagued by the mismanagement of its oil wealth, the ills of the resource curse are long-lasting and difficult to avoid, creating problems which have become endemic in nature.

Approaches aimed solely at short-term stabilization to facilitate the free flow of oil, serve only to create a temporary peace and delay an inevitable return to insurgency. There remains an urgent need to address the underlying drivers of conflict which have for too-long been left unresolved: the unequal distribution of oil revenues, institutionalized corruption and patronage, economic underdevelopment, environmental damage and the loss of traditional livelihoods.

The government has recently indicated it may be willing to pay greater attention to these underlying drivers, with President Buhari and Vice President Yemi Osinbajo making high-profile visits to the region. This visible diplomacy is designed to reassure locals that the central government is now listening to their concerns and taking account of their interests, whilst President Buhari has also indicated that the controversial amnesty scheme many now be maintained. These developments indicate a potential shift in the government’s strategy in the early months of this year – away from one being based solely on military force, towards one based on wider engagement.

However, despite the increased interactions between government officials and local stakeholders in the Niger Delta, resolving the underlying drivers will remain extremely difficult due to the ingrained and intractable nature of the issues involved.

At the state level, corruption remains endemic in Nigerian politics, facilitating the continued dominance of the political elite whilst preventing faster progress in regional development. At the local level, the political economy of violence is deeply entrenched in society, leaving the financial incentives for militancy looking attractive in the absence of alternative employment opportunities.

The prevalence of these norms creates a mutually-reinforcing cycle in which key stakeholders in the government and local populations often have vested interests in the continuation of instability, which poses a significant obstacle to productive peace negotiations.

The emergence of the NDA and the recent upsurge in militant activity, must therefore be viewed as a continuation of the historical pattern of violence in the Niger Delta; the causes of which are complex, multiple and overlapping. Attempts at resolution are likely to be fraught with difficulty, as the negative impacts of resource management in the region have fostered deeply-ingrained tensions between the local population, the oil industry and government officials.

The murky politics of the energy sector continue to represent the largest obstacle to peace in the Niger Delta: rent-seeking and poor governance in this arena have fuelled decades of underdevelopment, exacerbating the inequalities which result in a disenfranchised population resorting to violence. For as long as the region’s inhabitants remain excluded from the benefits of oil wealth, the government will struggle to end the destructive cycle of poverty, marginalization and hopelessness which looks likely to spawn further waves of militancy.

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Is Nigeria’s Boko Haram insurgency over?

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Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari announced in December that Boko Haram’s last remaining stronghold had been captured by the military (Image source: Chatham House)

In the final days of 2016, Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari announced that the army had captured Boko Haram’s last stronghold in the remote Sambisa forest in the northeast of the country. President Buhari said the successful operation marked the ‘‘final crushing’’ of Boko Haram, bringing an end to the brutal seven-year insurgency which has killed 15,000 people and displaced more than two million.

The apparent defeat of Boko Haram follows a year in which the group appeared to be in turmoil after a dispute between two of its dominant figures. In August, long-time militant leader Abukakar Shekau claimed to still be in command, despite an earlier statement by IS – to whom Boko Haram pledged allegiance in 2014 – that he had been replaced as leader by Abu Musab al-Barnawi. The dispute was the strongest indication yet of a more widespread split within the terrorist organization, which had already been significantly weakened by a Nigerian military offensive over the past 18 months.

For some time, the long-running Islamist insurgency – which began in 2009 – has looked to be in a state of gradual decline: militants have been forced to retreat into their rural heartlands after being pushed back from the urban areas they once controlled by a regional coalition of troops from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger.

However, the group have seemingly been on the cusp of defeat on several occasions in the past, yet each time have fought back – proving themselves to be more resilient than expected. This article looks back at the key developments and crucial moments over the last seven years of the insurgency, before asking how Boko Haram was able to emerge to control large swathes of Nigeria in the first place, and how it can be prevented from doing so again.

Since its emergence as a military force in 2009, Boko Haram has forged a reputation as a particularly brutal terrorist group, pressing its objectives through a wave of killings, bombings, and abductions across Nigeria. It gained widespread international media coverage in April 2014, after the kidnapping of more than 200 girls from their boarding school in the town of Chibok. This thrust the situation into the global spotlight, prompting widespread outrage and strong condemnation from Western governments. Since pledging allegiance to IS later the same year, the Boko Haram conflict has often been simplified and presented within the overall narrative of global Islamic terrorism; however in reality, the background to the militancy is complex, with many factors being responsible for the rise of Boko Haram and its sustained campaign against the Nigerian state.

Boko Haram was formed in 2002 by Muslim Cleric Mohammed Yusuf. Yusuf set up a religious complex consisting of a mosque and Islamic school with the aim of opposing Western-style education. The group set up its headquarters in the north-eastern city of Maiduguri, and became known by the local population as Boko Haram – which loosely translates from the local Hausa language as ‘Western education is forbidden’.

Based on its radical interpretation of Islam, Boko Haram’s aims quickly moved beyond just education and morphed into a wider, longer-term political objective: to overthrow the Nigerian government and establish an Islamic Caliphate.

In July 2009, Boko Haram shifted its focus to full-scale militant insurgency, launching a campaign of violence in Borno state, killing hundreds of people in attacks on marketplaces, police stations and government buildings. The response from the Nigerian military was immediate: security forces launched a sustained assault, seizing the group’s headquarters and killing its leader along with many of its fighters. At this point, Boko Haram appeared to be decimated; yet its fighters were soon able to re-group under a new leader, Abubakar Shekau.

Under the leadership of Shekau, recruitment soared and Boko Haram gained a reputation for committing acts of horrific brutality, launching a campaign of high-profile attacks throughout Nigeria. In August 2011, Boko Haram extended its reach to the capital, killing 23 people in a suicide bombing at the UN headquarters in Abuja. In January 2012, more than 100 civilians were killed in a single day of co-ordinated bombings and shootings in the town of Kano.

As the violence escalated, the government struggled to maintain control, leading former president Goodluck Jonathan to declare a state of emergency in May 2013, in the three northern provinces of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. Troops were deployed to the region to combat the growing militant threat, leading to Boko Haram fighters being pushed out of their urban base Maiduguri, retreating to the dense Sambisa forest and the Mandara Mountains close to the border with Cameroon.

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A coalition of West African states have undertaken a sustained military offensive against Boko Haram since January 2015 (Image Source:VOA)

However, the insurgency proved difficult to put-down, and attacks by Boko Haram continued. Militants once again emerged from their rural hideouts to launch attacks on towns and villages – looting property, carrying out mass killings, abducting women and girls, and conscripting men and boys into their army. In April 2014, the group launched its most notorious attack, kidnapping more than 200 girls from a boarding school in Chibok. Some of the girls have recently been released, but the whereabouts of many others remains unknown.

By the end of 2014 the group had pledged its allegiance to IS, and rebranded itself as IS’ West Africa Province. Despite this development, the Nigerian military continued to push back the jihadists. In recent years, many Boko Haram fighters have been killed and large quantities of weapons have been seized, leaving the group seemingly on the edge of extinction once more. Yet given its past resilience, Boko Haram’s demise is far from certain; and to avoid it rising up once again, a key question must be answered: how was Boko Haram able to emerge as a group powerful and resourceful enough to wage a sustained seven-year insurgency, which wrought havoc across large swathes of territory and threatened the Nigerian state?

A large part of the answer lies in its ideological pull to those who may be sympathetic to its core values: an extreme form of Islam based on Sharia Law, the desired creation of a caliphate, vehement opposition to the West, and the concept of waging war against the Nigerian state.

However, an often-overlooked, but ever-present set of underlying, inter-related factors was vital in driving recruitment and sustaining Boko Haram in the area of northern Nigeria in which it first sprung-up: poverty, underdevelopment and economic marginalization.

This same set of conditions has been a common feature in the emergence of many other groups which have fought against the State throughout recent history. This story is particularly relevant to many other countries in Africa – particularly those with vast natural resources such as oil and minerals – where economic growth has gone hand-in-hand with growing inequality. In this sense, Nigeria can be understood to be suffering from the ‘resource curse’ – a situation in which oil wealth encourages corrupt governance, resulting in vast inequalities between regions and social groups, leading to an increased risk of poverty-induced conflict. Nigeria is now Africa’s largest economy, yet it is also one of the continent’s most unequal societies: in the north, 72% of the population live in poverty, compared to just 27% in the south.

Some may contend that a combination of poverty, unemployment and hopelessness have created a strong sense of resentment amongst the northeast’s generation of disenchanted young men, making the area fertile ground for jihadist groups such as Boko Haram. This wide pool of potential recruits, along with the manipulation of religion by Boko Haram as a vehicle for mobilization, is a key reason as to why the insurgency was able to be sustained for so long.

At present, however, the group finally looks on the verge of defeat – with no major strongholds left and splits in its leadership, Boko Haram appears to no-longer have an effective command structure. Its remaining fighters are likely to splinter into smaller factions, with little capacity to operate beyond remote areas or pose a large-scale threat as they once did. However, despite successes in driving back the militants, the authorities should be wary: if the underlying conditions remain unchanged, the militancy is likely to lie dormant beneath the surface, only to re-emerge once more. A military strategy alone therefore cannot remove the threat entirely. To ensure peace prevails in the coming years, a long-term strategy is needed: one which also addresses the economic and social conditions which have sustained seven-years of insurgency.

Angola’s low-level Cabinda insurgency shows signs of life

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The disputed Cabinda Province is an exclave of Angola situated between Congo-Brazzaville and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The FLEC rebel group has fought for independence since the 1960’s. (Image Source: CIA; Wikipedia)

In the six years since a high-profile militant attack in Cabinda on the Togo football team gained global attention, the long-running insurgency in Angola’s isolated Cabinda province has once again drifted out of international headlines. The conflict and fight for independence – led by separatist group The Front for the Liberation of the State of Cabinda (FLEC) – was assumed until recently to have fizzled out, underpinned by the assumption that FLEC has been in a state of gradual long-term decline, with less than 200 active members and dramatically reduced fighting capabilities. However, a recent spate of attacks have followed FLEC’s pledge earlier this year to resume its armed campaign against the Luanda government, signalling a period of heightened intensity and demonstrating that the struggle for Cabinda is far from being over.

FLEC can best be described as a relatively small and fragmented insurgent group, who contest Angola’s ‘occupation’ of the territory and have fought for independence since the early 1960’s.  The group first took up arms against the former colonial power, Portugal, before continuing their insurgency after Angola gained independence in 1975. Cabinda – a thin slice of territory situated between Congo-Brazzaville and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – is home to around 700,000 people, and as an exclave, is geographically isolated from the rest of Angola. The insurgency was at its strongest during the Angolan civil war, which ended with a peace deal in 2002 between the government and the main rebel group UNITA. The nationwide conflict allowed FLEC to exploit an atmosphere of chaos and disorder within the country, enabling it to run an effective campaign of guerrilla warfare which was successful in destabilizing the region.

At the end of the civil war, Angola’s newly-elected MPLA government launched a direct and sustained offensive against FLEC, severely degrading its military capabilities and sending its leaders fleeing into exile. During the 2000’s, the group’s presence significantly waned as it splintered into disparate factions, including FLEC-Posicao Militar (Military Position) led by an exiled leader in France, and FLEC-FAC (Armed Forces of Cabinda) – a larger and better-organized faction, which continued to wield considerable influence over the organization. In 2006, Angola’s government reached a controversial peace deal with one of the group’s factions, which was signed on behalf of FLEC by divisive figure Antonio Bento Bembe, who later joined the Luanda government. Bembe had little credibility amongst the majority of FLEC’s supporters, and as a result, the memorandum has been described by analysts as largely meaningless and ineffective. The peace deal served only to cause further divisions and frictions within the group, which has since fractionalized further and continued its insurgency, albeit at a low level of intensity such that it has barely registered with the outside world.

However, this widespread perception of FLEC’s diminishing power altered dramatically in January 2010, when separatists launched a surprise attack on the Togo football team’s bus, as it passed through Cabinda province for a match in that year’s African Cup of Nations tournament, which was hosted in Angola. The government and armed forces were drastically under-prepared and three people were killed by the rebels, drawing international attention to their struggle for independence and reminding the world of FLEC’s determination to pursue its cause. While a tragedy for the innocent people killed, the event sparked concerns at the time from analysts and human rights advocates that the government would launch a fresh crackdown on Cabinda, which had already been subjected to years of repression to compound its economic underdevelopment and high poverty rate. Prior to the attack, a 2009 report from Human Rights Watch had already raised concerns over arbitrary arrests, torture and inhumane treatment by Angolan security forces in Cabinda, carried out with impunity away from the scrutiny of international media spotlight.

Looking at Cabinda’s situation in the wider geopolitical context, a single most significant driving factor in its troubled history can be identified: oil. The presence of extensive energy resources in Cabinda is key to understanding its insurgency, along with providing an explanation for Angola’s desire to retain control of the province. Angola is amongst Africa’s largest producers of crude oil and has signed highly lucrative contracts with energy firms from the Unites States and China. It produces more than 1.75 million barrels of oil per day, of which approximately half is pumped from offshore fields off Cabinda’s Atlantic coastline – making the province a rich source of export earnings and providing an essential source revenue for the Luanda-based central government, which for this reason is unlikely to ever allow Cabinda to declare independence. Despite its resource-wealth, Cabinda remains Angola’s most impoverished region, with few benefits from the oil industry trickling down to local people. This causes much resentment amongst the region’s inhabitants, and continues to provide motivation for FLEC’s armed struggle against the state.

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Angola’s government announced a controversial peace agreement with FLEC in 2006. However, the group has since splintered into factions and the low-level insurgency continues. (Image Source: David Stanley, Flickr)

Since the attack on the Togo team bus, the insurgency has continued at a low-level, under the radar of western news outlets. However in February 2016, FLEC issued its most significant statement in years, declaring that it would resume its armed campaign after the government failed to respond to its request for talks. The press release stated that FLEC would once again adopt the ‘’military way’’ until the Luanda Administration agreed to a ‘’serious and concrete dialogue’’.

So far, FLEC appears to have stood by its tough rhetoric, evidenced by a spate of attacks throughout 2016. FLEC released a statement earlier this year to AFP news agency, saying that it staged two attacks in March resulting in the deaths of around 30 Angolan military personnel, including an ambush on 13 March in the northern town of Buco-Zau which killed 20 government troops. This was followed by an extremely rare incident in May, during which armed men claiming to be from FLEC boarded an offshore Chevron Gas Platform off the coast of Cabinda. According to witnesses, the group of 5 militants approached the rig on a speedboat, before boarding the platform and warning foreign energy industry workers that they should leave the province. Although no-one was harmed, this incident offers the most significant indication yet that FLEC possesses the level of capability necessary to target the country’s heavily-guarded energy installations. Since the altercation, the Angolan Navy have stepped-up patrols around the dozens of oil and gas rigs dotted along Cabinda’s coastline, whilst civil society activists have reported an increased military presence in the province.

Recent months have seen further reports of clashes between FLEC fighters and the Angolan armed forces. FLEC has claimed that 9 Angolan soldiers were killed and 14 wounded in clashes during July, in addition to another 12 troops killed during an ambush on 4 September in the Buco-Zau region close to the border with the DRC. However, it must be noted that Angola’s government has neither confirmed nor denied these reports, which are often difficult to independently verify due to the supposed location of the incidents in remote areas. Some analysts have indicated that the reported rise in violence could be attributed to the death of 88 year-old FLEC-FAC founder Nzita Henriques Tiago in Paris earlier this year. This theory suggests that the death of such a unifying figure has the potential to cause further splintering into sub-groups, which would then naturally seek to increase their influence by raising the intensity of their operations, which could provide an explanation for the increased level of separatist activity witnessed so far in 2016.

The renewed violence puts Cabinda’s plight back under the spotlight: it remains a geographically-isolated, underdeveloped and impoverished region, with its people receiving few benefits from the province’s substantial oil wealth. Some have even drawn parallels with the situation in the Niger Delta, where militants have long fought for greater control over resources from the central government and foreign-owned energy companies. Despite the reports of renewed clashes, the Angolan government maintains that FLEC poses no overall threat to stability in the region, with provincial Governor Aldina da Lamba Catembo confidently declaring that FLEC ‘’does not exist’’. However, recent events contest this assertion, and instead suggest that Cabinda’s five-decade old insurgency may be about to enter a period of heightened intensity.

In the wider context, the deteriorating situation in Cabinda is unfortunately not a one-off: instead, it serves as yet another reminder of the problems long-associated with the ‘resource curse’, which appears to remain prevalent across many states in Africa and across the developing world. Cabinda is therefore an example of how the resource curse can make already-complex territorial and nationality-based disputes worse: fuelling resentment, compounding failed attempts at development, and often giving rise to intractable conflicts.

Gabon remains fragile after post-election violence

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Incumbent Ali Bongo was declared the winner of Gabon’s disputed presidential election, defeating rival Jean Ping and winning a second 7-year term with 49.8% of the vote (Image Source: UK Foreign Office)

On 24 September Gabon’s constitutional court issued a final ruling which upheld President Ali Bongo’s narrow election victory over rival candidate Jean Ping, signalling an end to the country’s recent political turmoil. Whilst stability has been restored for now, tensions are likely to remain bubbling just beneath the surface after large-scale opposition protests were ended violently by Gabon’s security forces following the controversial August 27 vote.

The official result – announced three days after the polls closed – handed incumbent Ali Bongo a second seven-year term in office with 49.8% of the popular vote, compared to 48.2% for rival candidate Jean Ping. With a winning margin of just 5,594 votes, the opposition labelled the election as fraudulent and demanded a re-count in the eastern province of Haut Ogooue, where turnout was 99.93% and 95% of people voted for President Bongo. Election analysts have argued that 99% turnout is almost impossible even in countries where voting is compulsory, whilst Gabon’s own interior ministry said turnout in other provinces ranged from 45-71%, further raising concerns and highlighting the suspicious nature of the result in Haut Ogooue.

International observers questioned the result almost immediately, whilst Jean Ping said the election outcome bore the ‘’hallmarks of dictators and tyrants who refuse to give up power’’. Opposition activists and many Gabonese citizens also questioned why it took the electoral commission more than three days to count votes in a country of just 1.8 million people, raising fears of vote-rigging and exposing an obvious lack of transparency.

Despite these accusations, the confirmation of the result through the constitutional court has lengthened the rule of one of Africa’s most entrenched political dynasties. Bongo’s father – Omar Bongo – had previously ruled Gabon for 42 years up until his death in 2009, holding on to power through an extensive patronage network in which oil revenues were used to buy-off political opponents and clamp down on opposition.

When protests erupted following the disputed result, President Bongo acted quickly to maintain his grip on power over a population clearly demonstrating its outrage at perceived corruption within the political establishment. At least three people were shot dead by security forces and hundreds were wounded after crowds attempted to storm the offices of the electoral commission in Libreville. The army fired stun grenades, tear gas and live bullets at protestors, yet the government has disputed these accusations and accused the opposition of fabricating its claims. The opposition contends that the death toll could be far higher than official figures, suggesting that up to 100 people may have been killed in several days of violence in the aftermath of the result being announced.

Opposition leader Jean Ping also told news outlets that his party headquarters had been bombed by a presidential guard helicopter, whilst security forces detained members of his National Union Party inside the building. The army also cracked-down on protestors who attacked and set fire to the National Assembly building on 31st August, which sustained significant damage. Interior minister Pacome Moubelet Boubeya said that 1,200 people had been arrested across the country after stability had been restored. The UN, US and France have all called for restraint and advocated for greater transparency with regard to the election results.

In the build-up to the constitutional court ruling on 24th September, there were widespread fears that the outcome would spark a new wave of riots across the country. Residents in Libreville scrambled to stockpile food and water supplies in the days leading up to the ruling, whilst the army erected road checkpoints around the capital and security forces patrolled the streets in an attempt to avoid a repeat of the violent scenes enacted in immediate aftermath of the election.

These fears proved to be unfounded as the security forces were better-prepared, meaning that a second wave of violence failed to materialize when the court announced its verdict. The ruling reaffirmed Bongo’s victory and declared the count in Haut Ogooue province was accurate. The court actually slightly increased Bongo’s share of the vote to 50.66% and reduced Ping’s to 47.24%, due to a correction of voting irregularities at 21 polling stations. In an attempt to ease tensions and heal divisions President Bongo rejected the need for international mediation and called for political dialogue, offering to include opposition lawmakers in his new cabinet.

Stability appears to have been restored in Gabon for now, yet the violent scenes and brutal crackdown in the aftermath of the election shows just how quickly events can turn. Whilst a repeat of the violence fortunately did not take place after the court ruling reaffirmed Bongo’s grip on power, recent events are indicative of divisions and tensions within Gabonese politics which are likely to remain dormant just beneath the surface, with the potential to quickly reignite during any future period of political upheaval.

In light of the violence, human rights group Amnesty International has warned that security forces in Gabon must ‘’refrain from using excessive force against protestors’’, stating that ‘’such a brutal response violates protesters’ rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, as well as inflaming an already tense situation’’.

In the wider context, Gabon’s disputed election and the ensuing unrest provides further evidence of the continuation of a worrying historical trend across the region, whereby political elites attempt to cling on to power through manipulating election results, altering electoral procedures and clamping-down on opposition groups. Gabon can now be added to the growing list of countries in sub-Saharan Africa which have suffered election-related instability in recent years – with other examples including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya and Zimbabwe – indicating a continued lack of transparency in democratic processes across the continent, which all too often results in violence.

DRC: political instability threatens to re-ignite Africa’s deadliest war

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More than 6 million people have been killed in the DRC’s long-running conflict, with the most intense period of fighting taking place from 1998-2003. (Image Source: MONUSCO)

Since gaining independence from Belgium in 1960, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has experienced decades of almost continuous conflict. Africa’s largest country, with a burgeoning population of more than 79 million people, has arguably been the site of the deadliest war in the post-WW2 era: a brutal conflict which has taken place beyond the view of the western news media; remaining far from the eyes of western publics and politicians. Despite more than 6 million civilians killed and millions more displaced, the neglect of the DRC’s devastation has been striking: there have been few front-page headlines, and even fewer calls for intervention in a country deemed strategically unimportant to western powers.

Since the most deadly period of the conflict ended with a peace agreement in 2003, low-intensity violence has continued in the East of the country largely un-noticed by the outside world, barring a few brief moments of heightened publicity such as the ‘Kony 2012’ social media campaign, and after the 2013 military defeat of the notorious M23 rebel group. At present, the risk of escalation and a return to full-scale conflict is higher than at any time in recent memory, as the country is fast becoming engulfed in political instability.

The renewed fears of violence come amid concerns that President Joseph Kabila, who has won two previous elections and been in office since 2001, is attempting to cling to power despite a two-term constitutional limit on the length of time a president can serve. In May, opposition leader Moise Katumbi was charged with plotting a coup against the incumbent regime, just hours after he declared his intention to run as a candidate in November’s presidential election.

The situation is creating an increasingly hostile political environment within the country, with critics accusing President Kabila of seeking to delay the vote in an attempt to remain in power whilst the constitution is amended. National Assembly member Olivier Kamitatu Etsu has accessed Kabila of ‘’deliberately sabotaging the electoral process’’. However the President has consistently denied this, with the DRC’s Ambassador to the United States, Francois Balumuene, stating that Kabila remains committed to holding free and fair elections. In May, the country’s highest court ruled that Kabila should stay in power until elections are held, and the government has claimed that the poll is simply being delayed whilst logistical issues are resolved and the electoral register is updated. The division amongst the political elite is already causing tensions amongst the general population, leading to fears of renewed violence based on political affiliation. There were reports of clashes between police and Katumbi supporters at several of his rallies earlier this year, with tear gas being fired on at least one occasion.

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President Joseph Kabila has been accused of seeking to change the country’s constitution, which would prevent him from seeking a third term in power. (Image Source: MONUSCO)

The current political environment is especially concerning when considering the DRC’s continuing violence and perpetual climate of instability. An estimated 70 armed groups are believed to be currently active in the East of the country, despite the presence of 19,000 UN peacekeepers. In particular, the stronger armed groups such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) continue to terrorize civilians and retain control of rural areas characterized by weak state presence. Millions of civilians have been forced to flee the violence: the UN estimates that there are currently 2.7 million people internally displaced, along with another 450,000 refugees who now reside in neighbouring countries.

The violence in the East of the country is worsening, as armed groups increase in number 13 years on from the end of the ‘Second Congo War’ which lasted from 1998-2003. During the main stage of the conflict, Congolese government forces backed by troops from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe fought rebels supported by Uganda and Rwanda. Five million people were killed during this period alone, until a peace deal was signed in 2003 and a transitional government ushered in. Despite these developments, the war-ravaged country has been plagued by frail governance, weak institutional presence, pervasive corruption and widespread absence of the rule of law. The government did achieve a notable success in 2013, when the largest rebel group M23 was defeated and removed from a key provincial capital, Goma. However, the many remaining rebel groups have splintered further, leading to a more complex situation and a climate of lawlessness in which ordinary civilians have been subjected to rape, sexual violence, extreme poverty and horrific human rights violations.

In hindsight, 2003 offered only a brief flicker of hope for a country reeling from decades of war. The Democratic Republic of Congo has since descended into further chaos: it has resisted all internal and external efforts to set it on a path towards peace, and has become an increasingly complex web of inter-related and over-lapping local conflicts. Remnants of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) persist in some parts of the country, whilst Bakata separatists operate in Katanga province; numerous other rebel groups are active in Maniema and Nyunzu. The extensive number of armed groups adds to an increasingly complex and volatile picture of a country which even after billions of dollars in development aid and the largest UN peacekeeping mission in history, remains incapable of providing even the most basic requirement for citizens of a functioning sovereign state: security. A combination of impunity and continuing economic stagnation, have led to the emergence of yet more armed groups, making the DRC an increasingly fragmented and ungovernable space.

Whilst western attention has remained almost exclusively focused on the civil war in Syria – where over 250,000 civilians have been killed during five years of devastation – the victims of the DRC’s long-running conflict have been comparably neglected when considering the scope of the violence: decades of upheaval with more than 6 million people killed, and hundreds-of-thousands more raped, tortured and maimed. In addition, the DRC remains one of the world’s poorest countries, ranked at 176 on the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI). Since the war officially ended in 2003, starvation and disease have claimed millions more lives, whilst living standards and health provision have plummeted in many communities still trapped in cycles of violence.

Some analysts contend that the conflict in the DRC is ‘too complicated’ to be taken-up by mainstream news organizations and presented to western audiences, with a distinct lack of the simple ‘good vs evil’ narrative which is often prevalent in western news reporting. For example, in the DRC there is no single ‘aggressor’ to whom blame can be predominantly assigned, such as was the case with Gaddafi in Libya or Saddam Hussein in Iraq. However, given the sheer scale of violence in the DRC, there must also be alternative underlying factors which account for the distinct lack of media coverage: for example, sub-Saharan Africa is viewed as being of little strategic importance to the west, whilst stereotypical assumptions of Africa as a space of uncivilized barbarism remain prevalent in many dominant discourses, leading to the complex roots of diverse conflicts across an entire continent being downplayed and under-examined.

Article 12 (3) DRC
The UN estimates that there are 2.7 million people currently displaced in the DRC, in addition to 450,000 refugees who now reside beyond its borders (Image Source: Julien Harneis)

This continued media invisibility is especially concerning given the most recent developments in the DRC. Firstly, presidential candidate Moise Katumbi was sentenced in June to 3 years in prison on charges which the opposition contends were fabricated and politically-motivated. Secondly, despite renewed calls for dialogue between political parties to ensure a peaceful electoral process, President Kabila has refused to say if he will step-down (as is constitutionally required), and is yet to confirm that the general election will go ahead as scheduled in November.

The main concern amongst observers is that if the current political instability worsens, the complex web of local conflicts in the DRC could be set to rapidly intensify, leading to violence on a nationwide scale in the event of an election-related crisis. This worst-case scenario has not yet materialized and may still be avoided; however if a wave of political violence does spread across the country, Africa’s deadliest civil war could re-emerge to inflict mass suffering on civilians, whose predicament will again remain largely invisible to an outside world focused on developments elsewhere.