Northern Mali gripped by chronic instability

Article 14 (1) Mali
Tuareg rebels have been fighting for independence in northern Mali since January 2012 (Source: Wikipedia/Magharebia)

Mali appears to be in a state of perpetual instability: a string of recent high-profile terrorist attacks has added to a picture of nationwide de-stabilization, amid continued fighting between numerous armed groups in the West African country’s fractured northern region.  After a period of relative calm since last November’s attack on a hotel in Bamako which left 20 dead, renewed violence has broken out: in July, Tuareg fighters attacked an army base in Nampala, leaving 17 soldiers dead and 35 wounded. As a result, Mali’s lawmakers have now extended the state of emergency for an additional eight months, reflecting the worsening security situation in a country which has been plagued by conflict from multiple sources across the past five years.

Mali’s current wave of violence began in January 2012, when several insurgent groups launched a sustained campaign against the Malian government directed towards achieving independence or greater autonomy for the north, in an area known as Azawad. In March of that year, President Amadou Tourmani Toure was removed from office in a military coup, launched as a result of his poor handling of the ensuing crisis. In the power vacuum that followed, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) – a group fighting to forge an independent homeland for the Tuareg people – took control of large swathes of Northern Mali.

This event became known as the ‘Tuareg Rebellion’, which was fuelled by an influx of weapons to the Sahel region following the ousting of Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The collapse of the Gaddafi regime left Libya to descend into a state of chaos and lawlessness; prompting many ethnic Tuareg’s living in the North African country to return home to the Sahel, becoming involved in the insurgency in Mali and other conflicts across West Africa.

The success of the Tuareg rebels however was short-lived: their rebellion was hijacked and their territorial gains were soon wiped-out by a collection of more extreme Islamist groups such as Ansar Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). By the end of 2012, Islamist groups had taken-over large portions of territory encompassing more than 50% of Mali’s land area, imposing strict sharia law in areas under their control.

Article 14 (2) Mali
After an uprising in 2012, Tuareg and Islamist rebel groups seized large swathes of territory in northern Mali (Source: Wikipedia/Orionist)

By January 2013 the situation had spiralled out of control, and Mali’s government asked for external assistance to re-take the north from the rebels. On 11th January the French military began operations against the Islamists, whilst on 23rd April the UN established the United Nations Multi-dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), deploying 12,000 peacekeeping troops to Mali’s troubled northern region. In support of these engagements, the US established a drone based in Niger to provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to France and its partners in fighting extremism. African Union (AU) Forces from the neighbouring states of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania and Niger also played a role in combating the militants, fearing the spread of instability across borders and into the surrounding region.

By the end of 2013 the situation had stabilized: Mali had a new President, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita; whilst the government had regained the majority of Islamist-held territory, facilitated through the support of its international partners. In June 2013 a preliminary peace deal was signed between the government and Tuareg rebels; however many Islamist groups were not included and some of the original signatories later pulled-out of the agreement. The next two years saw the continuation of sporadic violence until a more meaningful ceasefire was signed between the major parties in Algeria in February 2015.

Article 14 (4) Mali
12,000 UN peacekeepers are based in Mali as part of MINUSMA, at the request of Mali’s government (Source: Wikipedia/Marie-Lan Nguyen)

An initial hope that the deal would signal an end to the conflict proved to be unfulfilled. Fighting is still ongoing despite the continued presence of French troops and UN forces, whilst the number of terrorist attacks increased dramatically throughout 2015. In March, a gunman representing militant group Al-Mourabitoun killed five people in a gun attack on a restaurant in Bamako, whilst six MINUSMA soldiers were killed by members of AQIM in a roadside ambush near Goundam in July. In August, gunmen attacked a residential building housing UN sub-contractors resulting in the deaths of ten people, whilst in October six civilians were killed in a rocket attack on a UN convoy on-route to the northern city of Gao.

However, the most dramatic attack occurred in November 2015 when militants from AQIM and al-Mourabitoun attacked the Raddison Blu hotel in Bamako, in a well-coordinated gun assault. The militants took 120 hostages and killed 14 foreigners along with six Malians, before the siege could be brought to an end by security forces. The attack claimed international headlines, and for the first time focused global attention on Mali’s worsening predicament.

The Bamako hotel attack led many western policy-makers and media analysts to frame the instability in Mali in the context of the wider global picture of Islamic terrorism, linking the situation to the ideology of groups such as ISIS in Syria and Boko Haram in Nigeria. Others were keen to frame the situation in the national context in the form of a simplistic North-South divide, between the secular government in Bamako and Islamist militants fighting for an independent state in the north. In reality however, the roots of violence in Mali are far more complex, with a history of grievances and conflict stretching back over many years.

Firstly, there are no clear ‘sides’ which can be distinguished, as the various inter-locking conflicts consist of multiple actors with opposing, contrasting and contradictory aims. For example, over the last four years the MNLA umbrella grouping which originally led the 2012 insurgency has splintered into numerous groups and militias, including Ansar Dine and a number of smaller Islamist groups. In addition, AQIM and Al-Mourabitoun have grown in prominence and capability, whilst the Malian government is allied with external forces from France, the UN and several AU countries in combatting an increasingly diverse array of opponents. As a result, the Malian conflict can be described as multi-faceted with no clear narrative: it is more a collection of separate integrated conflicts which feed into an overall climate of instability, resulting in the de-stabilization of the country and the fracturing of society.

Secondly, a history of economic underdevelopment goes a long way towards explaining the repeated patterns of violence which have plagued the region. For many ordinary people in the north, sympathy for rebel groups is fuelled by more basic and instinctive considerations than adherence to an ideology of independence or Islamism. A high youth unemployment rate, along with lack of access to vital services such as education and healthcare, has culminated in widespread discontent with the central government in Bamako. The UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) estimates that 1.5 million people in Mali are threatened by food insecurity, whilst 150,000 have been made refugees and another 90,000 internally displaced by the conflict. Discontent has also been heightened by the government’s failure to address corruption; leading many Malian’s to grow tired of the country’s poor governance and unequal society. Many across the north feel that the region has been neglected by the Bamako elite, culminating in a strong sense of frustration and resentment which fuels jihadist recruitment.

SONY DSC
The conflict has resulted in 150,000 refugees, along with 90,000 internally displaced (Source: Wikipedia/EU ECHO)

Thirdly, climate-induced environmental stresses are an exacerbating factor, adding to the multiple political and economic drivers of an already-complex conflict. In recent decades drought has become more frequent, whilst average rainfall in northern Mali has dropped by 30% since 1998 according to a study by the US Strategic Studies Institute. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (UNAO) estimates that more than 270,000 people here face starvation, with more than 660,000 children in need of food aid in order to survive. Looking further into the future, the Sahara desert is predicted to expand southward at a rate of 48km per year. This could force nomadic herding communities to migrate into lands historically occupied by other groups, fuelling resource-based tensions and resulting in an increased frequency of inter-communal conflicts in the Sahel region.

Such a dire scenario fits in with long-held predictions from researchers that climate change has the potential to worsen conflict in the world’s poorest regions, leading groups to take up arms to fight over increasingly scarce resources. In the already-complicated conflict landscape of northern Mali, there is a clear potential for environmental stresses to exacerbate poverty, fuelling grievances and providing further motivation for deprived individuals to join rebel groups in a region which has long been neglected and has few economic opportunities.

Overall, the conflict in Mali cannot be defined through any simple narrative: it is not a clearly-demarcated battle between north and south; and neither does it fit squarely into the wider global picture of ISIS-inspired Islamist extremism. Instead, the conflict in Mali is complex: it has numerous causes and drivers, and is typified by multiple actors fighting for territory, resources and ideology in an under-developed region which offers few alternatives or opportunities. Therefore there is no simple solution: whilst substantial diplomatic engagements and co-ordinated multi-state military operations may have the effect of temporarily lessening conflict and creating a momentary illusion of stability, the repetitive cycles of deprivation and conflict will only be ended once the underlying issues are tackled over the long-term.

Advertisements

DRC: political instability threatens to re-ignite Africa’s deadliest war

M-23 crisis in Goma
More than 6 million people have been killed in the DRC’s long-running conflict, with the most intense period of fighting taking place from 1998-2003. (Image Source: MONUSCO)

Since gaining independence from Belgium in 1960, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has experienced decades of almost continuous conflict. Africa’s largest country, with a burgeoning population of more than 79 million people, has arguably been the site of the deadliest war in the post-WW2 era: a brutal conflict which has taken place beyond the view of the western news media; remaining far from the eyes of western publics and politicians. Despite more than 6 million civilians killed and millions more displaced, the neglect of the DRC’s devastation has been striking: there have been few front-page headlines, and even fewer calls for intervention in a country deemed strategically unimportant to western powers.

Since the most deadly period of the conflict ended with a peace agreement in 2003, low-intensity violence has continued in the East of the country largely un-noticed by the outside world, barring a few brief moments of heightened publicity such as the ‘Kony 2012’ social media campaign, and after the 2013 military defeat of the notorious M23 rebel group. At present, the risk of escalation and a return to full-scale conflict is higher than at any time in recent memory, as the country is fast becoming engulfed in political instability.

The renewed fears of violence come amid concerns that President Joseph Kabila, who has won two previous elections and been in office since 2001, is attempting to cling to power despite a two-term constitutional limit on the length of time a president can serve. In May, opposition leader Moise Katumbi was charged with plotting a coup against the incumbent regime, just hours after he declared his intention to run as a candidate in November’s presidential election.

The situation is creating an increasingly hostile political environment within the country, with critics accusing President Kabila of seeking to delay the vote in an attempt to remain in power whilst the constitution is amended. National Assembly member Olivier Kamitatu Etsu has accessed Kabila of ‘’deliberately sabotaging the electoral process’’. However the President has consistently denied this, with the DRC’s Ambassador to the United States, Francois Balumuene, stating that Kabila remains committed to holding free and fair elections. In May, the country’s highest court ruled that Kabila should stay in power until elections are held, and the government has claimed that the poll is simply being delayed whilst logistical issues are resolved and the electoral register is updated. The division amongst the political elite is already causing tensions amongst the general population, leading to fears of renewed violence based on political affiliation. There were reports of clashes between police and Katumbi supporters at several of his rallies earlier this year, with tear gas being fired on at least one occasion.

Article 12 (2) DRC
President Joseph Kabila has been accused of seeking to change the country’s constitution, which would prevent him from seeking a third term in power. (Image Source: MONUSCO)

The current political environment is especially concerning when considering the DRC’s continuing violence and perpetual climate of instability. An estimated 70 armed groups are believed to be currently active in the East of the country, despite the presence of 19,000 UN peacekeepers. In particular, the stronger armed groups such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) continue to terrorize civilians and retain control of rural areas characterized by weak state presence. Millions of civilians have been forced to flee the violence: the UN estimates that there are currently 2.7 million people internally displaced, along with another 450,000 refugees who now reside in neighbouring countries.

The violence in the East of the country is worsening, as armed groups increase in number 13 years on from the end of the ‘Second Congo War’ which lasted from 1998-2003. During the main stage of the conflict, Congolese government forces backed by troops from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe fought rebels supported by Uganda and Rwanda. Five million people were killed during this period alone, until a peace deal was signed in 2003 and a transitional government ushered in. Despite these developments, the war-ravaged country has been plagued by frail governance, weak institutional presence, pervasive corruption and widespread absence of the rule of law. The government did achieve a notable success in 2013, when the largest rebel group M23 was defeated and removed from a key provincial capital, Goma. However, the many remaining rebel groups have splintered further, leading to a more complex situation and a climate of lawlessness in which ordinary civilians have been subjected to rape, sexual violence, extreme poverty and horrific human rights violations.

In hindsight, 2003 offered only a brief flicker of hope for a country reeling from decades of war. The Democratic Republic of Congo has since descended into further chaos: it has resisted all internal and external efforts to set it on a path towards peace, and has become an increasingly complex web of inter-related and over-lapping local conflicts. Remnants of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) persist in some parts of the country, whilst Bakata separatists operate in Katanga province; numerous other rebel groups are active in Maniema and Nyunzu. The extensive number of armed groups adds to an increasingly complex and volatile picture of a country which even after billions of dollars in development aid and the largest UN peacekeeping mission in history, remains incapable of providing even the most basic requirement for citizens of a functioning sovereign state: security. A combination of impunity and continuing economic stagnation, have led to the emergence of yet more armed groups, making the DRC an increasingly fragmented and ungovernable space.

Whilst western attention has remained almost exclusively focused on the civil war in Syria – where over 250,000 civilians have been killed during five years of devastation – the victims of the DRC’s long-running conflict have been comparably neglected when considering the scope of the violence: decades of upheaval with more than 6 million people killed, and hundreds-of-thousands more raped, tortured and maimed. In addition, the DRC remains one of the world’s poorest countries, ranked at 176 on the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI). Since the war officially ended in 2003, starvation and disease have claimed millions more lives, whilst living standards and health provision have plummeted in many communities still trapped in cycles of violence.

Some analysts contend that the conflict in the DRC is ‘too complicated’ to be taken-up by mainstream news organizations and presented to western audiences, with a distinct lack of the simple ‘good vs evil’ narrative which is often prevalent in western news reporting. For example, in the DRC there is no single ‘aggressor’ to whom blame can be predominantly assigned, such as was the case with Gaddafi in Libya or Saddam Hussein in Iraq. However, given the sheer scale of violence in the DRC, there must also be alternative underlying factors which account for the distinct lack of media coverage: for example, sub-Saharan Africa is viewed as being of little strategic importance to the west, whilst stereotypical assumptions of Africa as a space of uncivilized barbarism remain prevalent in many dominant discourses, leading to the complex roots of diverse conflicts across an entire continent being downplayed and under-examined.

Article 12 (3) DRC
The UN estimates that there are 2.7 million people currently displaced in the DRC, in addition to 450,000 refugees who now reside beyond its borders (Image Source: Julien Harneis)

This continued media invisibility is especially concerning given the most recent developments in the DRC. Firstly, presidential candidate Moise Katumbi was sentenced in June to 3 years in prison on charges which the opposition contends were fabricated and politically-motivated. Secondly, despite renewed calls for dialogue between political parties to ensure a peaceful electoral process, President Kabila has refused to say if he will step-down (as is constitutionally required), and is yet to confirm that the general election will go ahead as scheduled in November.

The main concern amongst observers is that if the current political instability worsens, the complex web of local conflicts in the DRC could be set to rapidly intensify, leading to violence on a nationwide scale in the event of an election-related crisis. This worst-case scenario has not yet materialized and may still be avoided; however if a wave of political violence does spread across the country, Africa’s deadliest civil war could re-emerge to inflict mass suffering on civilians, whose predicament will again remain largely invisible to an outside world focused on developments elsewhere.

Yemen facing humanitarian crisis as war takes devastating toll on civilians

One year on from the start of a bombing campaign against Houthi rebels, launched by a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states, the air strikes continue as the increasingly complex war in Yemen shows little sign of ending. The impact on civilians has been huge: almost 6,000 have been killed, 2.5 million displaced from their homes, and almost 20 million people left without access to a regular food supply, safe drinking water or medical supplies. Whilst the world’s attention has been focussed on Syria, the destructive war in Yemen has left the country on the edge of ruin, and the population on the brink of a humanitarian disaster.

The conflict has its origins in September 2014, when Houthi rebels based in the north of the country, launched an offensive against the government and seized control of the capital, Sanaa. The country’s President, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi was initially placed under house arrest, before fleeing across the border to neighbouring Saudi Arabia. In the following months, the rebels quickly took control over almost all of western Yemen, whilst government forces retreated to the east. In the midst of the chaos, jihadist militant groups such as Al-Qaeda were also able to exploit the power vacuum and gain a foothold.

The Houthis, who constitute a minority of Yemen’s population, allied with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was ousted from power during the 2011 Arab Spring protests. Saleh remained a powerful force in Yemeni politics, retaining the loyalty of a large portion of the security forces.

Article 8 (1) Sanaa
Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, has been under the control of Houthi rebel forces since September 2014 (Image Source: Ferdinand Reus)

The major Gulf power, Saudi Arabia, looked on with increasing concern and interest as the conflict unfolded across its southern border. In March 2015, the Saudi defence minister Prince Salman quickly assembled a coalition of Arab air forces, including the UAE and Bahrain, and began a campaign of air strikes against the rebels on 26th March. Initially, the alliance hoped that their overwhelming firepower would turn the tide of the conflict within a few months; yet 12 months later, little progress has been made and civilian casualties are mounting.

Over the past 12 months Saudi Arabia has been increasingly involved, training and equipping forces loyal to President Hadi in an attempt to confront the rebels on the ground. Law and order has collapsed, leaving the country in a state of chronic disintegration with no central authority. In the East, the conflict has gained a new layer of complexity as armed militias and violent jihadist groups have emerged to play a more prominent role.

There is now growing international opposition to the bombing campaign, with the EU Parliament recently voting to call for the imposition of an arms embargo on Saudi Arabia. However, not all world powers share this view, as the US and the UK have continued to supply aircraft and weapons to their long-standing regional ally Saudi Arabia, including precision-guided missiles which have been used in the air campaign.

Whilst numerous human rights groups have argued that civilians represent the majority of casualties from air-strikes, the Arab coalition has said that its targets are chosen carefully, and continue to insist that they abide strictly to international rules on the conduct of war. Several previous attempts at peace talks in Switzerland have failed, but a new round of talks is due to be held in Kuwait in the coming weeks, initiating a renewed attempt to find a solution. However, as the war has become increasingly complex and more international actors have become involved, a peace deal any time soon is looking unlikely.

To understand the complexity of the conflict, it is important to look at the wider strategic context. The division between Sunni and Shia Muslims has long been a source of tension in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia (the most powerful Sunni state) sharing an intense and long-standing rivalry with Iran (the most powerful Shia state). The Houthi rebels in Yemen are also Shia, and are backed by Iran. In this context, the conflict in Yemen can be viewed as a sectarian, proxy war between the two regional rivals, with Saudi Arabia reluctant to allow one of its neighbours to be controlled by a Shia-led government, and determined to maintain its dominant influence in the Arabian Peninsula.

These tensions have flared up more visibly in recent years as the Middle East has entered a period of upheaval, and Iran has re-entered the international community after signing a nuclear deal with the West. As a result of these two factors, the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has increased dramatically, with both states looking to increase their control and influence over the region, driven by a sense of paranoia and opportunity. In particular, Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has become more assertive and outward-looking since King Salman replaced King Abdullah in January 2015, revoking the country’s traditional diplomatic stance in favour of a more confrontational and active approach.

Article 8 (2) Saudi Air Strike
A coalition of Arab states led by Saudi Arabia has been conducting air strikes against Houthi rebels since March 2015 (Image Source: Ibrahem Qasim)

As this geopolitical game has extended its influence to Yemen over the last 18 months, it is civilians who suffer the worst consequences. Yemen was already the poorest country in the Arab world before the conflict began, plagued by years of instability, poor governance and widespread poverty. Even prior to the conflict, 50% of Yemen’s population lived below the poverty line, whilst the youth unemployment rate was over 60%. Now, after 18 months of fighting, the humanitarian situation has ‘severely deteriorated’, according to the UN’s Human Rights Co-ordinator Johannes van der Klaauw. Since the conflict escalated in March last year, the UN estimates that 5,878 civilians have been killed and up to 30,000 wounded. The country’s infrastructure has been almost completely destroyed, and basic services have ground to a halt.

Both sides in the war have been accused of committing serious abuses, many of which amount to war crimes. Human rights groups have accused the Saudi-led coalition of using cluster bombs, and targeting homes, hospitals and factories. The Houthi rebels have also been accused of shelling residential areas and laying mines; whilst the UNHCR said in November last year, that it has verified more than 8000 reports of human rights violations since the conflict began.

Further exacerbating the effect on civilians, the Saudi-led coalition has imposed crippling import restrictions and a naval embargo on the country, resulting in severe food and fuel shortages. According to a UN report, 21 million out of Yemen’s 26 million population now require humanitarian aid, whilst 19.3 million are without access to safe drinking water, and 2 million people are ‘acutely malnourished’.  In addition, 14 million people lack basic healthcare due to the destruction of hospitals and a lack of supplies, whilst 1.8 million children have been unable to go to school. An estimated 120,000 people have fled the country, whilst those that do remain in Yemen, live under the fear of constant bombardment from aerial attacks and ground fighting. Humanitarian organizations attempting to work in the country have been severely hampered by funding difficulties and access constraints.

As each month passes, the situation for civilians in Yemen is becoming increasingly desperate. A solution looks to be a distant prospect, as the conflict continues largely un-noticed by an outside world focused on recent developments in Syria and Europe. Obscured from view, the war in Yemen shows little sign of ending, leaving its cities in ruin and its citizens on the edge of a humanitarian catastrophe.

Political crisis pushes Burundi to the brink of a second Civil War

Burundi is a state in turmoil: a political crisis accompanied by escalating levels of violence, is threatening to plunge the country into conflict – little more than ten years after the end of a devastating 12-year civil war which left 300,000 dead.

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra-ad Al Hussein, recently said that ‘’all the alarm signals – including the increasing ethnic dimension of the crisis – are flashing red’’ indicating that a ‘’complete breakdown of law and order, is just around the corner’’. President Obama has also expressed concerns, stating in November: ‘’from Burundi’s painful past, we know where this type of violence can lead. Leaders in Burundi have spewed hateful rhetoric, and terrible acts of violence have taken the lives of innocent men, women and children.’’

Since the turn of 2016 the situation has become far worse, as violence has continued almost un-noticed by the outside world. If the situation is not stabilized soon, Burundi’s unfolding crisis could quickly descend into a return to full-scale civil war.

Article 7 (1) - Burundi
Burundi’s Civil War lasted for 12 years from 1993-2005, resulting in the deaths of more than 300,000 people (Image Source: AFRICOM)

The current crisis began in April 2015, when President Pierre Nkurunziza announced he was running for a third-term in office, in violation of the country’s constitution. In response, thousands of demonstrators took to the streets in protest. Police responded by opening fire on the crowds, killing two people and wounding many others.

The violence has continued to spread and an attempted military coup was thwarted in May 2015, by which time more than 217,000 people had fled to the neighbouring states of Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Little has been done to bring the violence under control, with peace talks put on hold and the African Union (AU) opting not to send a peacekeeping force.

Over the past 10 months since the crisis began, the violence has escalated. Government forces have responded brutally in the face of opposition, launching a campaign of murder and intimidation in the neighbourhoods where the protests originated. An atmosphere of fear and impunity now prevails, as the independent media has effectively been shut-down, and human rights organizations have been forced out of the country.

According to the UN, at least 439 people have been killed in the conflict so far, whilst disappearances have become routine. The most widely-publicized act of violence to date occurred on 11th December, when security forces responded to an attack on military installations in the capital city Bujumbura, by executing at least 87 civilians within the space of just a few hours. The UN estimated that at least 130 people were killed in December, making it the deadliest month in the conflict so far.

There have been allegations of large-scale arrests and extra-judicial detentions in ‘secret prisons’, whilst there have also been accusations of torture and documented cases of sexual violence against women. Witnesses and satellite images have indicated the existence of at least nine mass graves, which have appeared in and around the capital in recent months.

When considering the historical context of violence in Burundi, the outlook for the current conflict looks increasingly dangerous. The previous civil war began in 1993, after the democratic election of President Melchior Ndadaye. President Ndadaya was ethnically Hutu; whereas previously the country’s political elite had been dominated by the minority Tutsi population. Just three months into his term, Ndadaya was assassinated, leading to a cycle of revenge attacks, after which the country became locked in a bitter, ethnic-based civil war.

The conflict ended in 2005 after 12 long years, which had resulted in 5% of the total population being killed, and thousands more displaced. A new era of democracy was ushered in with the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. Crucial to Burundi’s future stability and integration of the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, the agreement recognized that the conflict was caused by ‘’a struggle by the political class to accede and/or remain in power’’, as opposed to being a result of ethnic hatreds.

The new constitution outlined a power-sharing structure and set a strict two-term limit for presidents. It was president Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third-term, in opposition to the constitutional limit, which initiated the current political crisis and ensuing wave of violence.

Article 7 (2) - Burundi
President Pierre Nkurunziza’s run for a third-term in office, sparked Burundi’s political crisis which began in April 2015 (Image Source: World Economic Forum)

So far, the opposition movement has remained largely united across ethnic lines. However, this situation is dangerously at risk of fracture – a development which would almost certainly result in a rapid descent towards civil war. The government has been accused of playing the ‘ethnic card’, demonising communities and attempting to divide the population for their own political advantage.

The UN Special Advisor on Genocide, Amada Dieng, has spoken of this worrying trend, suggesting: ‘’we can observe today in Burundi, a clear manipulation of ethnicity by both the government and opposition. We know that ethnicity can be used to divide populations and spread hatred among them, which can have tragic consequences.’’

This worrying development, evidenced by the direct targeting of Tutsis by the security forces and more divisive government rhetoric, is a sign that the conflict is beginning to take on a distinctly ethnic dimension.

Some analysts have highlighted parallels between Burundi today, and neighbouring Rwanda in the build-up to its 1994 genocide, in which 800,000 people were killed. Others have argued that the current crisis has so far remained predominantly political in nature, and has not yet divided the population along ethnic lines.

However, in a country plagued by past conflict, and with its political leaders seemingly willing to incite hatred and stir-up existing divisions, there are growing signs that Burundi – a country which has enjoyed relative peace, stability and progress over the last 10 years – has been set on a rapidly deteriorating trajectory by its political elite, leaving ordinary citizens fearful of a return to civil war.

South Sudan remains fragile after two years of Civil War

After gaining independence from Sudan in 2011, the mood in South Sudan was one of celebration and hope for the future. However less than five years later it has gone from being the world’s newest country to a ‘failing state’, after experiencing two years of brutal conflict which have divided the nation along ethnic lines.

Despite a ceasefire being signed in August 2015, South Sudan remains wounded, tense and bitterly divided, with the prospects of a lasting peace looking unlikely. The country’s civil war, characterized by horrific human rights abuses and attacks on civilians, has taken place largely outside the glare of media spotlight. Over the past two years the conflict has claimed more than 50,000 lives, with at least 1.6 million people internally displaced and 12,500 UN peacekeepers being deployed in an attempt to stabilize the situation.

Article 3 - South Sudan (1)
The Civil War in South Sudan began in December 2013 (Image Source: Steve Evans)

The civil war began in December 2013, when President Salva Kiir Mayardit – also head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) which had fought for independence – sacked his entire cabinet and accused Vice President Riek Machar of instigating a failed coup against his regime.

The feud between two rival politicians quickly escalated in to full-scale conflict, and took on a strong ethnic dimension from the start, dividing South Sudan between its two largest ethnic groups. The Dinkas aligned with President Kiir, whilst the Nuers largely supported the rebel movement led by Machar.

The conflict which followed has had devastating effects on South Sudan’s civilian population. Rape and sexual violence have been used as a method of intimidation, child soldiers have been recruited to fight, whilst property has been looted and entire villages have been destroyed. The violence has also severely affected South Sudan’s economy: the farming industry has ground to a halt, causing nationwide food shortages and leading to widespread hunger and starvation. In 2014, the UN described the country’s food crisis as the ‘’worst in the world’’, with up to 4 million people severely affected and up to 50,000 children dying of malnourishment.

Whilst recent atrocities committed in the Middle East have frequently made the front pages of newspapers, the horrific scale of human rights abuses in South Sudan has continued almost un-noticed by the outside world. In April 2014 rebels attacked a UN base in Jonglei state, killing 58 people including many children, before UN peacekeepers could intervene. When the town of Bentiu was seized, civilians were massacred in a hospital, with one UN worker describing the scenes as ‘resembling the 1994 Rwandan genocide’.

Thousands of women and girls have been abducted, tortured and raped; whilst ethnic cleansing has taken place on a mass scale: men have frequently been executed by both sides, with some eyewitness reports even claiming that babies have been burned alive.

The people who have somehow managed to survive are now living in desperate, cramped conditions, seeking refuge on UN bases. Food and water supplies are scarce, whilst the spread of disease is rife. As a result of the conflict, South Sudan now has amongst the highest rates of starvation and infant mortality in the world.

However, there have recently been positive developments. In August 2015 a peace agreement was signed after several rounds of negotiations. However the deal remains fragile, with frequent armed clashes initiated by both sides regularly violating the ceasefire.

Article 3 - South Sudan (2) SPLA Officers
South Sudanese Army Generals during the 2011 Independence celebrations (Image Copyright: Steve Evans)

A question many are now asking in light of the initial celebratory mood after South Sudan’s ‘liberation’; is ‘how has it come to this?’

Firstly, the US-supported independence campaign and western-funded state-building project, presented a simplified picture and glossed over the internal divisions within South Sudan. Before the independence referendum in 2011, the issue was simplified as being the ‘Christian South’ breaking away from the ‘Muslim North’; ignoring the underlying deep-rooted ethnic tensions which would inevitably make the process of uniting the South more difficult than it appeared.

The main focus was on building infrastructure and state institutions, at the expense of ensuring good governance, resource redistribution and reconciliation. For example since independence, 38% of oil revenue has been spent on the military whilst just 7% has been spent on education. President Kiir has struggled to transform the SPLM from being a militant liberation organization into a democratic political party. Political elites have been accused of displaying increasingly autocratic behaviour, whilst creating divisions and stirring ethnic tensions.

Despite the recently improved situation the prospects for long-term stability do not look good, as many obstacles to peace remain. Firstly, both sides have committed in the past to end the fighting, but have routinely broken their promises to launch new offensives. Secondly, the power-sharing agreement does not tackle the issues of accountability and justice, whilst it also leaves the underlying causes of the conflict unresolved. Thirdly, there is dis-unity on both sides of an increasingly complex conflict: there are hardliners in both camps, whilst broad coalitions of civilian militias and military units will be difficult to control.

Going forward, South Sudan’s neighbours are likely to play a key role in mediation. However to add to the complexity, they are also divided and have competing aims. For example, Uganda has consistently supported President Kiir; Sudan has allegedly provided weapons and logistical support to the rebels; whilst Kenya has a key interest in the situation considering its strong economic links with South Sudan.

In the end, the civil war has served only to cause mass human suffering, deepen ethnic animosity and create a heavily militarized society with a dangerous culture for revenge. The cycle of conflict which has plagued South Sudan will be difficult to break without addressing the underlying causes. Considering the region’s troubled history of violence and a society now deeply fractured along ethnic lines, the outlook is bleak. South Sudan has the potential to become ‘another Rwanda’; the world is again at risk of a horrific genocide taking place in Africa almost un-noticed, outside the gaze of the mainstream media, and largely ignored by western politicians before it is too late.